Regulating Information Flows in Capital Markets by Dombalagian, Onnig H.
SMU Law Review
Volume 68 | Issue 3 Article 14
2015
Regulating Information Flows in Capital Markets
Onnig H. Dombalagian
Tulane University of Louisiana, odombala@tulane.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Tribute is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Onnig H. Dombalagian, Regulating Information Flows in Capital Markets, 68 SMU L. Rev. 727 (2015)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol68/iss3/14
REGULATING INFORMATION FLOWS IN
CAPITAL MARKETS
Onnig H. Dombalagian*
INCE the New Deal, U.S. securities law has been grounded in the
twin goals of "full and fair disclosure" and "fair and honest mar-
kets."1 To this end, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and other U.S. securities regulators historically have focused on compel-
ling ever-increasing disclosures from issuers and capital markets in-
termediaries to facilitate publicly informed trading. As adaptive tools
emerge to facilitate the aggregation and transformation of information
for financial decision-making, 2 it has become equally important to con-
sider not just what is disclosed, but how information is processed and
used throughout the information production chain-from originators,
through intermediaries, and ultimately, by end users.
In recent years, the SEC and other market regulators accordingly have
come to pay greater attention to the entire process by which information
is gathered, verified, disseminated, and used.3 In particular, the informa-
tional infrastructure of securities markets traditionally has relied on a
subset of highly regulated entities to intermediate information flows on
behalf of the public-these include issuers, exchanges, investment banks,
auditors, lawyers, securities analysts, and credit rating agencies. Informa-
tion tends to flow through these well-regulated nodes in securities mar-
kets, often to the exclusion of new channels or categories of
intermediation. In the wake of the near collapse of our financial sector
over the past decade, policy makers have not only sought to assess the
relative culpability of these intermediaries, but have also questioned their
faith in the continued vitality of the regulatory framework we inherited
from the twentieth century.
As we reflect on the life and scholarship of Professor Bromberg, one of
our nation's preeminent scholars in securities regulation, it is an oppor-
tune time to look forward as well and to sketch the informational ar-
rangements and regulatory infrastructure necessary to meet the needs of
the twenty-first century. As information flows upend established in-
termediaries and transcend national markets, policy makers must
* George Dendgre Professor of Law, Tulane University School of Law
1. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74, 74; 15 USC § 78b (2012).
2. See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REv. 678, 703-10 (2013).
3. See ONNIG H. DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING TH TAPE: INFORMATION LAW AND POL-
ICY IN CAPITAL MARKETS 1-3 (2015). The ideas introduced in this contribution are more
fully developed in my monograph.
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decouple the principles that govern information creation, compilation,
processing, verification, and dissemination from increasingly arbitrary
statutory classifications and jurisdictional boundaries. Instead, they must
move toward a holistic regulation of the information production chain.
This contribution considers the objectives of information regulation in
capital markets, contemporary challenges to the current regulatory
framework, and some perspectives on the future of capital markets
regulation.
I. REVISITING THE OBJECTIVES OF INFORMATION
REGULATION
The goals of capital markets regulation are often couched in lofty terms
such as "investor confidence" and "investor protection," which defy pre-
cise definition. 4 When speaking about the regulation of information flows
in securities markets, scholars often invoke the concept of market effi-
ciency-how quickly and costlessly new information is incorporated into
market prices-as the touchstone for framing the goals of regulatory pol-
icy. 5 Gilson and Kraakman's seminal "mechanisms of market efficiency,"
for example, explain that the cost of acquiring, processing, and verifying
information dictates how information is distributed among market par-
ticipants. 6 As a result, the relative efficiency of a market will turn upon
the extent to which regulatory and commercial intermediaries reduce the
collective cost of compiling, processing, and disseminating information so
that market prices can efficiently move toward equilibrium. 7
The use of, or reliance on, intermediaries is not itself costless, of
course: intermediaries may fail to exercise due diligence, succumb to con-
flicts of interest, or fall prey to the same irrational behavior as nonprofes-
sional investors. 8 Even as technological advances reduce acquisition,
processing, and verification costs, financial innovation heightens the need
for informational intermediaries to understand new products and vouch
for their suitability. 9 The regulation of financial information thus presents
many of the same policy ends and means as other forms of commercial
information that are imbued with an element of consumer protection or
public interest.
To address these challenges, policy makers must remain open to new
approaches to achieving these longstanding objectives of information pol-
icy in capital markets. Chief among these regulative objectives is promot-
4. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About Investor Pro-
tection in the Face of Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1591, 1599-1612 (2006).
5. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanics of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549, 554-59 (1984).
6. Id. at 565.
7. Id. at 612-13.
8. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of
Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 11-17 (2004); Charles R.P. Pouncy, Contemporary
Financial Innovation: Orthodoxy and Alternatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 505, 576-89 (1998).
9. See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, "Pure Informa-
tion, " and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REv. 1601, 1671-75 (2012).
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ing transparency, fair access, standardization, verification, and
interpretative transformation, while policing information flows for integ-
rity and reliability, with a view to economizing on the costs of information
dissemination and use. In each case, traditional approaches have relied
on direct regulation of information originators or the intermediation of
highly regulated entities in the information production chain. More mod-
em approaches, meanwhile, tend to carve out room for private ordering
and market-based mechanisms.
A. CALIBRATING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESS
Most of capital markets regulation naturally focuses on calibrating the
disclosure and dissemination of information-be it in the form of com-
pany disclosures published by issuers of financial instruments, market
data from exchanges and other trading venues, or data and indices used
in more elaborate financial contracts or products. Those who own or con-
trol the flow of information often have incentives to restrict its availabil-
ity or accessibility. For example, supporters of mandatory disclosure and
transparency rules often argue that an exclusive creator or provider of
information may refuse to release it or compile it in a form suitable for
use by others, whether because of the cost of production, the impact of
public disclosure on its other operations, the incentive to discriminate
among potential users, or the ability to control downstream uses. 10
Securities laws, therefore, mandate some degree of transparency or ac-
cess on the grounds that information is a public good or that disclosure is
necessary to prevent fraudulent, opportunistic, or unfairly discriminatory
behavior. Disclosure and data dissemination requirements may be im-
posed on public companies based on factors such as size and profitability
or the diffusion and sophistication of their shareholder base. 1 Regulators
might also seek to dictate the price and contractual terms on which mar-
ket information is licensed or accessed, or alternatively, to regulate com-
plex licensing arrangements that finance the cost of producing or
verifying information.12
At the same time, there is a growing recognition that transparency and
access rules need to be better tailored to the needs of individual issuers
and investors and to the objectives of particular trading markets. As a
result, novel approaches to tiering transparency and access requirements
often incorporate market-based elements. For example, academics have
renewed efforts to conceive of more elaborate systems to provide order-
10. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REv. 717, 723-37 (1984); Merritt B. Fox, Retain-
ing Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85
VA. L. REV. 1335, 1343-46 (1999).
11. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, "Publicness" in Contem-
porary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 351-71 (2013); Jeff
Schwartz, The Law and Economics of Scaled Equity Market Regulation, 39 J. CoRe. L. 347,
352-56 (2014).
12. See DOMBALAGIAN, supra note 3, at 107-13.
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ing for issuers and investors beyond the decision to go public or list on an
exchange. 13 Meanwhile, policy makers have taken concrete steps to de-
velop market-based systems for tiering information disclosure to facilitate
transactions among issuers and investors-particularly for the benefit of
smaller companies for whom traditional mandatory disclosure require-
ments are prohibitively expensive. 14
B. DEREGULATING STANDARDIZATION
Regulators also routinely grapple with the problem of structuring infor-
mation to make it amenable to comparative analysis. Standardization of
narrative disclosures, financial statements, market prices, or asset-level
data facilitates comparison of similar products or transactions. Technical
standards, for example, are necessary for the accessibility and interoper-
ability of market systems. At the same time, standards for the content
and format of information can become unnecessary (and unhelpful) when
information users are able to exercise their own judgment as to how to
compare information, 15 or when they threaten to dampen heterogeneity
in the interpretation of information. 16
The way standards are promulgated often is as important as the content
of standards because of the dynamic standard-setting process. Policy mak-
ers, for example, must decide whether to "make or buy" standards for
compliance with disclosure or access requirements.' 7 Traditionally, regu-
lators have preferred to set standards themselves or to delegate standard-
setting to highly regulated standard-setting bodies, such as exchanges or
self-regulatory organizations. Such approaches may nevertheless frustrate
innovation in the development and dissemination of information, particu-
larly to the extent that standard-setters are not responsive to changes in
the marketplace.
More recently, regulators have shown a greater willingness to tolerate
the co-existence of standards and to delegate more authority to standard-
setting organizations, such as with respect to U.S. and international ac-
13. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM
FOR SECURITIES REGULATION 112-46 (2002); Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issu-
ers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV. 279, 310-26 (2000); Alan R. Palmiter,
Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 108-20.
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(b) (2012) (exempting platforms for trading in certain privately
placed securities from broker-dealer regulation); Directive 2014/65, of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on Markets in Financial Instruments and
Amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU, recit. 132 & art. 33, 2014 O.J.
(L 173) 349, 368, 418-19 (encouraging development of trading facilities for "small and
medium-sized enterprises"); see also Jose Miguel Mendoza, Securities Regulation in Low-
Tier Listing Venues: The Rise of the Alternative Investment Market, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP.
& FIN. L. 257, 273-83 (2008).
15. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Eco-
nomic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 491-98 (1998).
16. See infra note 23.
17. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J.
389, 390-95 (2003).
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counting standards or internal controls for financial reporting.' 8 As dele-
gation becomes the norm, policy makers must assure themselves of the
representativeness, objectivity, and flexibility of the processes used by
standard-setters in establishing, interpreting, and modifying standards, as
well as the public's ability to access privately developed standards. 19 In
some cases, this may entail establishing governance and funding arrange-
ments designed to eliminate undue influence of major market partici-
pants and to promote responsiveness.to emerging conditions. 20
C. IMPROVING THE QUALITY AND UTILITY OF INFORMATION
Professional intermediaries map meaning onto data to create higher
orders of information and knowledge. Informational intermediaries-
such as investment banks, exchanges, and benchmark providers-per-
form a variety of services to help investors and traders process, verify and
interpret information in capital markets. Some intermediaries (such as
data vendors) merely aggregate information from a variety of sources,
whereas others (such as auditors and underwriters) verify the quality the
information provided by an information originator. Still others may trans-
form information gathered from multiple sources into an opinion, index,
rating, or other more actionable format. Reliance on the efforts of such
intermediaries may significantly reduce the cost of diligence and decision-
making by investors and traders.
The use of intermediaries nevertheless raises questions about how to
monitor their diligence and conflicts of interest. Regulators have taken a
variety of approaches to regulating the role of informational in-
termediaries in capital markets, particularly in the wake of recent crises.
In some cases, information providers have been (and remain) regulated
as an industry utility-regulators grant such providers significant privi-
leges vis-A-vis other market participants and subject them to more inten-
sive supervision to ensure the quality of their product.21 More commonly,
the reflexive response to financial crises has been to impose (or, once
imposed, to heighten) professional or fiduciary obligations on producers
and third-party gatekeepers, such as underwriters, accountants, lawyers,
analysts, and credit-rating agencies. 22
For other types of information, financial incentives and performance
standards may strengthen commercial pressure to maintain quality and
integrity. For example, regulating interpretive intermediation-such as
18. See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 8879, 73 Fed. Reg. 986 (Jan. 4, 2008); Securi-
ties Act Release No. 8238, 68 Fed. Reg. 36636, 36642 (June 18, 2003) (recognizing stan-
dards for internal controls over financial reporting under federal securities disclosure).
19. Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 2011-5, Incor-
poration by Reference at 2 (Dec. 8, 2011) (stating that "the greatest challenge agencies
face" when incorporating private standards by reference or otherwise encouraging their
use is to ensure that interested parties have reasonable access).
20. See DOMBALAGIAN, supra note 3, at 126-30.
21. See, e.g., RUBEN LEE, RUNNING THE WORLD'S MARKETS 126-44 (2011).




discovering prices or opining as to credit risk-through mandatory rules
or professional responsibilities may result in an undesirable homogeneity
of trading methods or rating methodologies. 23 By contrast, more modern
regulatory approaches are geared toward improving responsiveness to
public needs. For example, new compensation models may eliminate con-
flicts of interest and encourage accountability to users of information,24
while performance standards based on measurable outcomes may en-
courage creative diversity.25
D. PROMOTING REAL-TIME INTEGRITY
Regulators also play an important role in ensuring the integrity of fi-
nancial information and the infrastructure of capital markets. 26 Investors
and intermediaries generally expect information to be available and ac-
cessible in a fair and orderly manner, free of distortion or manipulation.
Fraudulent or manipulative activity can take a variety of forms, including
trading activity designed to artificially affect market prices, or submission
of orders designed to disrupt the trading activity of others.27 The theft or
abuse of inside information and other market-moving information is in-
creasingly regarded as a threat to confidence in public markets.28 The
glitches that plagued the Facebook IPO and triggered the Flash Crash of
May 6, 2010, have likewise focused attention on the reliability of the op-
erational systems that process information flows.2 9
23. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, CREDIT RAT-
ING STANDARDIZATION STUDY 21 (Sept. 2012).
24. Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Pro-
posal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 314-28 (2003); Jeffrey Manns, Rating
Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee Approach for Rating Agency Ac-
countability, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1011, 1059-69 (2009).
25. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese et al., Performance-Based Regulation: Prospects and
Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 705,
714-19 (2003) (discussing the utility of performance-based standards in regulation). But see
Roberta S. Karmel, Should a Duty to the Corporation Be Imposed on Institutional Share-
holders?, 60 Bus. LAW. 1, 18-21 (2004) (questioning whether performance statistics for
institutional investors encourage short-term focus); Lynn Bai, The Performance Disclosures
of Credit Rating Agencies: Are They Effective Reputational Sanctions?, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. &
Bus. 47, 59-71 (2010) (critiquing pre-Dodd-Frank rules that resulted in "substantially in-
consistent" reported data).
26. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, REGULA-
TORY ISSUES RAISED BY THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ON MARKET INTEG-
RITY AND EFFICIENCY 8 (consultation report, CR02-11, July 2011).
27. See, e.g., 1 PHILIP McBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES REG-
ULATION, §5.02[1]-[2] (2003); Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., Revolution in Manipulation
Law: The New CFTC Rules and the Urgent Need for Economic and Empirical Analyses, 15
U. PA. J. Bus. L. 357, 362-69 (2013).
28. Regulation 596/2014, art. 8, 2014 O.J. (L 173) (Market Abuse Regulation); see also
John C. Coffee, Jr., Introduction: Mapping the Future of Insider Trading Law: Of Bounda-
ries, Gaps, and Strategies, 2013 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 281, 296-311 (2013).
29. See, e.g., Regulation Systems Compliance & Integrity, Exchange Act Release No.
73639, 79 Fed. Reg. 72252 (Dec, 5, 2014) (adopting requirements for certain regulated enti-
ties "to comply with requirements with respect to the automated systems central to the
performance of their regulated activities").
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Regulators have traditionally relied on private antifraud litigation, in
addition to public enforcement actions, to deter manipulative and decep-
tive conduct in the United States. As scholars have called into question
the costs and benefits of private litigation, policy makers have come to
rely more heavily on public enforcement and real-time surveillance mech-
anisms to address market integrity concerns. 30 While stock exchanges and
other self-regulatory organizations generally have carried the burden of
establishing and maintaining such systems, the increasing fragmentation
of trading markets and competition among exchanges has compelled pol-
icy makers to devise alternative information gathering and monitoring
mechanisms. 31
These more intrusive forms of regulation may require greater and more
frequent disclosure of proprietary or customer information by market
participants. In particular, as part of Congress's efforts to regulate sys-
temic risk, the federal financial regulators have amassed the authority to
define and collect a broad array of information about the positions and
transactions of legal entities throughout the marketplace.32 These devel-
opments implicate the rights of market intermediaries and their custom-
ers to preserve the confidentiality of their trading and investment
strategies. 33
II. CHALLENGES TO INFORMATION POLICY
Advances in information technology have transformed capital markets
in a variety of ways, such as reducing the cost of gathering and dissemi-
nating information, and facilitating the real-time aggregation and process-
ing of financial data. These advances, however, have forced regulators,
markets, and intermediaries to reconfigure regulatory strategies to over-
see the information production chain holistically. For example, automa-
tion has severely taxed the infrastructure for information dissemination
created by regulators and regulated markets since the 1970s, while infor-
mation overload threatens to overwhelm the bounded rationality of
human investors and traders. Increasing globalization of capital markets
has likewise required regulators worldwide to consider how to share or
allocate jurisdiction over information products that facilitate cross-border
trading and investment.
30. Compare William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of
Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 70 (2011), with James D. Cox, Securities Class
Actions as Public Law, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNuMBRA 73 (2011).
31. Consolidated Audit Trail, Exchange Act Release No. 67457, 77 Fed. Reg. 45722,
45727-28 (Aug. 1, 2012) (requiring a national market system plan to create, implement,
and maintain a consolidated order tracking system).
32. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5343, 5344 (2012).
33. See Annette L. Nazareth & Margaret E. Tahyar, Transparency and Confidentiality





The automation of trading has revolutionized financial markets. Ex-
changes and rival trading venues have used new order display, routing,
and execution technologies to handle a greater volume of orders at lower
cost, and with greater speed and certainty of execution. Meanwhile, insti-
tutional investors, market makers, and proprietary traders have auto-
mated the analysis and execution of trading decisions. As a result,
automation is often credited for reducing transaction costs and improving
certain measures of liquidity and informational efficiency in securities
and derivatives markets. 34
At the same time, automation often appears to threaten the accessibil-
ity and reliability of our market infrastructure. New breeds of high-fre-
quency and algorithmic traders have capitalized on infinitesimal
informational advantages and inefficiencies in the trading infrastructure
of markets. While popular narratives decry their ability to eke out profits
at the expense of retail investors,35 their use of high-speed trading also
heightens the risk of adverse selection for market makers and the risk of
front-running to institutional investors. 36 Moreover, weaknesses in order
display and access systems, and intermarket controls may not only exac-
erbate opportunities for classic market disruption or manipulation, but
also increase the risk of nonlinear reactions to new information and of
disruptive feedback loops (as the Flash Crash of 2010 illustrated).3 7
More generally, corporate issuers and interpretive intermediaries must
reconfigure disclosure and dissemination practices to adapt to new pat-
terns of information use as human judgment is replaced by algorithms.
Efforts to promote interactive disclosure of narrative and financial infor-
mation may provide investors with better tools for making financial deci-
sions, but will increasingly squeeze out the contributions of less
sophisticated institutional and retail investors to short-term price discov-
ery. For example, the periodic or episodic disclosures that lawyers and
accountants carefully craft for both retail and institutional consumption
are often torn apart by algorithms within milliseconds. 38
34. Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 61358,
75 Fed. Reg. 3594 (Jan. 21, 2010) ("Equity Market Concept Release"); FORESIGHT: THE
FUTURE OF COMPUTER TRADING IN FINANCIAL MARKETS, London: UK Government Of-
fice for Science (2012).
35. See, e.g., MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH Boys (2014).
36. See, e.g., LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES 251 (2003) (describing para-
sitic order anticipation strategies); Equity Market Concept Release, supra note 34, at 3613.
37. FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010: REPORT OF THE
STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND SEC TO THE JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EMERGING REG-
ULATORY ISSUES 76-79 (Sept. 30, 2010).
38. Compare Elizabeth Blankespoor et al., Initial Evidence on the Market Impact of
the XBRL Mandate, 20 REv. ACCOUNTING STUDIES (forthcoming 2015) (finding wider
abnormal bid-ask spreads, a reduction in abnormal liquidity, and a decrease in abnormal
trading volume, particularly for small trades, in the market immediately following the in-
troduction of XBRL tagging), with Joung W. Kim et al., The Effect of Mandatory XBRL
Reporting across the Financial Information Environment Evidence in the First Waves of
Mandated U.S. Filers, 26 J. INFO. SYs. 127 (2012) (finding "an increase in information effi-
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These issues require policy makers to take a fresh look at how they
frame the goals of regulation-both at the level of market structure and
broader capital markets policy. Traditionally, policy makers have re-
sponded to automation by increasing trading controls and surveillance
tools, proposing to dampen or regulate certain trading strategies, or re-
doubling efforts to protect professionally informed trading from free-rid-
ing and predatory trading practices. 39 At a more abstract level, regulators
must consider how fairly and efficiently they can administer policies that
seek to promote "universally informed" trading as algorithmic trading
upends the idea of simultaneous and costless access to information.
One major shift would be to downplay the longstanding (if quixotic)
norm of universal access to information flows. As the practical feasibility
of providing retail investors with equivalent access to information and
trading opportunities wanes, a regime of fair and nondiscriminatory ac-
cess might improve price discovery by ensuring that all nodes along the
information chain enjoy equivalent access to information flows in relation
to their willingness to invest in the technology and expertise necessary to
exploit them.40
More generally, policy makers could view the entire information pro-
duction chain as one integrated system that should be subject to uniform
access rules. These rules might extend not only to traditional originators
and intermediaries in capital markets, but to news, government statistics,
and other public information affecting prices in securities and commodi-
ties markets consistent with constitutional protections for freedom of the
press.41 Such rules should nevertheless be offset by corresponding protec-
tions for retail and less sophisticated institutional investors who cannot
keep up with the financial "arm's race." '42
B. INFORMATION ANXIETY
Scholars have also increasingly sounded concern that the volume of
information coursing through today's financial markets overtaxes the
cognitive capabilities of information providers and users. The value of
information is naturally bounded by the tools available to map meaning
onto raw data; higher orders of knowledge and analysis require us to de-
velop increasingly intricate layers of abstraction in order to organize in-
formation effectively. Such anxiety can be attributed to a variety of
ciency, a decrease in event return volatility, and a reduction of change in stock returns
volatility" in the post-XBRL disclosure of sampled firms).
39. DOMBALAGIAN, supra note 3, at 172-76.
40. Stephen J. Choi, Selective Disclosures in the Public Capital Markets, 35 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 533, 572-73 (2002). For example, high-speed or high-frequency trading strategies
that are profitable only because of clandestine arrangements with information providers
may run dry if all traders have equal access to them.
41. Donna M. Nagy & Richard W. Painter, Selective Disclosure by Federal Officials
and the Case for an FGD (Fairer Government Disclosure) Regime, 2012 Wis. L. REv. 1285,
1351-65 (2012).
42. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, A Smarter Computer to Pick Stocks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
24, 2006 (quoting Andrew Lo).
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sources, including the ratcheting of lengthy, complex, or detailed disclo-
sure requirements; the increasingly granular allocation of risk through fi-
nancially innovative products; the increasing fragmentation of
information across multiple sources; and the diminished role of tradi-
tional intermediaries in facilitating collective diligence.43
In the long run, complexity should spur the emergence of new in-
termediaries or technologies to help end users standardize, process, and
interpret information more effectively; one policy approach, therefore, is
to focus solely on the information production cost to originators when
scaling disclosure or dissemination regimes. 44 Others, in contrast, have
argued that the information deluge leads to poorer short-term decision-
making, as heuristics or cognitive biases increasingly overtake rational
analysis and disrupt the efficient design, analysis, and pricing of financial
instruments. 45 Traditional policy responses to these concerns include,
among other steps, more paternalistic discretion over the products of-
fered in capital markets,46 or heightening the fiduciary and professional
obligations of informational intermediaries and institutional investors.47
At the same time, policy makers must do more than reshuffle responsi-
bility among a handful of regulated entities or information channels. They
must also think about creating room for alternative nodes and channels in
the information chain of global capital markets. At the level of basic reg-
ulatory infrastructure, regulators might take steps to better differentiate
the treatment of intermediaries based on the nature of the services they
provide. For example, gatekeeping responsibilities may make the most
sense for overseeing the activities of intermediaries that verify informa-
tion, while performance standards and incentive-based compensation
may provide a better-tailored regulatory framework for intermediaries
that use public information and perform a predominantly interpretive
function.
Promoting opportunities for greater competition and collaboration
among upstart intermediaries might further fuel interpretive intermedia-
tion. A regulatory policy encouraging good-faith use of smaller in-
termediaries over established intermediaries may improve competition
43. DOMBALAGIAN, supra note 3, at 180-83.
44. Schwartz, supra note 11, at 352-56.
45. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Con-
sequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 417 (2003); Schwarcz, Rethink-
ing the Disclosure Paradigm, supra note 8, at 1; Hu, Too Complex to Depict?, supra note 9,
at 1601; Joan MacLeod Heminway, The SEC's New Line-Item Disclosure Rules for Asset-
Backed Securities: MOTS or TMI?, 35 HAMLINE L. REV. 385, 405-11 (2012).
46. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA for Financial Innovation: Ap-
plying the Insurable Interest Doctrine to Twenty-First-Century Financial Markets, 107 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1307, 1348-57 (2013); Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval
of Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 113-29 (2012) (proposing, in
addition to "economic purpose," an "institutional capacity" test of the firm's ability to
manage risk and a "systemic effects" test); see also Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter,
Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177, 1256 (2012) (suggesting standardiza-
tion of derivatives and structured finance product offerings).
47. Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 17-20.
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for analytic services. 48 Some scholars have likewise advocated an "open-
source inspired approach" to level informational asymmetries and col-
laboratively detect flaws in models used by financial intermediaries.49
Regulators might further foster the development of new entrants by pair-
ing fair access with reasonable accommodations to downstream technolo-
gies, and overriding contract terms that unreasonably restrict
interoperability or the transformation of information in creative ways.
C. GLOBALIZATION
Globalization has forced policy makers to think about how to regulate
the flow of information across borders as capital markets have become
increasingly interconnected and interdependent. Capital markets have
benefited significantly from the surge of cross-border investment, trading,
and financial services activity. In response, the world's major securities
exchanges have undergone a wave of transnational mergers and mutual
investments with a view to creating transnational platforms for offering
and trading securities of global interest.50 As regulation becomes the
binding constraint on further integration of international markets, na-
tional regulators must balance the costs and benefits of extending infor-
mation policy extraterritorially, on the one hand, and relying on market
discipline and the diligence of their regulatory counterparts, on the other.
There is much room for diversity in the regulation of information prod-
ucts.5 1 For example, corporate governance and disclosure practices might
vary based on the legal, cultural, and economic arrangements in different
jurisdictions. The organization and composition of national and regional
markets will also call for different regulatory approaches to price discov-
ery and benchmark development. Regulators naturally fear, however,
that liberalization of regulatory standards will result in a "race to the bot-
tom" if they are unable to harmonize standards and coordinate supervi-
sion across borders. As a result, they have traditionally asserted the right
to regulate transactions conducted in or with significant effects in their
territorial jurisdiction, 52 while looking for ways to coordinate information
48. See, e.g., art. 8d of Regulation (EC) 1060/2009, 2009 OJ (L 302) 1, as amended by
Regulation (EU) 513/2011, 2011 OJ (L 145) 30, and Regulation (EU) 462/2013, 2013 OJ (L
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(2009).
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ulation of Global Exchanges, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & CoM. L. 355, 356-58 (2007)
(describing the impetus for cross-border mergers of financial exchanges and the regulatory
challenges faced by the SEC and EU capital markets regulators).
51. See Annelise Riles, Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws Approach,
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sharing with peer regulators in areas of mutual concern. 53
The regulation of information does not always easily fit into these cate-
gories. Channels for the collection of some types of information may en-
tail a sufficient degree of sovereign interest to warrant exclusive home
country regulation. For example, the borrowing costs of domestic banks
(a component of interest rate benchmarks such as LIBOR) may be
shrouded in secrecy during times of market stress,54 while the privacy ex-
pectations of homeowners whose mortgages underlie an issue of mort-
gage-backed securities might always remain a matter of domestic
consumer finance policy. Likewise, channels for the communication or
dissemination of certain investment strategies or product offerings at the
retail level ought to reflect domestic norms insofar as they must play a
role in financial planning for education, childrearing, and retirement.
As such jurisdictional boundaries blur, regulators have tepidly em-
braced more flexible approaches to managing information flows while
minimizing regulatory arbitrage. Traditional tools include accommoda-
tion of foreign practices or global standards in domestic regulation, mu-
tual recognition of foreign regulation, and, in some cases, deference to
the parties' choice of regulatory regime. 55 While these strategies have
been explored largely in the context of issuer disclosures, EU regulators
have also confronted the difficulties of harmonizing cross-border flows of
market information and benchmark regulation in the context of integrat-
ing the markets of its member states. The globalization of exchanges and
other quasi-public standard-setting bodies has offered an additional op-
portunity for transnational regulation of capital markets. 56
To this end, capital markets regulators might consider several steps to
eliminating barriers to harmonization. First, they must identify and agree
to respect sovereign interests with respect to disclosure requirements or
information channels that entail core domestic interests (e.g., inter-bank
lending, residential finance). Second, regulators should revisit disclosure
and dissemination requirements with a view to reallocating domestic re-
sponsibility for matters of national or cultural relevance (e.g., executive
compensation, corporate governance, social disclosures) out of capital
markets law.57 Elements of disclosure and information dissemination that
touch upon concerns about the marketing of securities might also be re-
written into business conduct rules for domestic intermediaries, rather
than capital markets disclosure standards.
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55. DOMBALAGIAN, supra note 3, at 202-06.
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[Vol. 68
Regulating Information Flows in Capital Markets
If domestic channels could thus be compartmentalized, regulators may
find it easier to delegate the establishment and maintenance of global
information channels to private or quasi-public standard-setting bodies.
For example, issuer disclosure requirements might be standardized by
competing regulated exchanges or regulated markets that operate a
global tier of trading under coordinated regulatory oversight. Meanwhile,
to compensate for the lack of effective oversight of foreign entities, regu-
lators might increasingly rely on algorithmic tools to screen for problem-
atic accounting practices, fraudulent disclosures, manipulative trading, or
benchmark manipulation.
III. CONCLUSION
As technology, financial innovation, and globalization erode the twen-
tieth-century framework for capital markets regulation, policy makers
must work to reframe traditional regulatory practices in light of the larger
information chain in which they operate. Competition and lowered entry
costs have increased the fluidity of the nodes and channels through which
information travels in financial markets. While regulators may build and
mandate certain channels for information production and dissemination,
they must increasingly rely on fair disclosure and fair access principles to
exploit more flexible private infrastructures for information flow. The
multiplicity of originators and users populating the information produc-
tion chain will also make coordinating standards within and across bor-
ders an increasingly difficult task.
The more nodes in the system, the greater the diffusion of responsibil-
ity for diligence, analysis, and value additivity borne by each. The recent
financial crisis-together with many of the episodic shocks to financial
markets over the past decade-has tested the wisdom of relying on an
extended production chain. But the information age compels us to move
forward. There may be some temptation-and occasionally some bene-
fit-to relying on trusted intermediaries with established regulatory re-
sponsibilities in lieu of the diffuse and untamed network that increasingly
informs modern capital markets. However, a regulatory framework
grounded in access and interoperability-backstopped by the mandate of
transparency and the fear of surveillance, where appropriate-may better
prepare us for the innovations that lie ahead.
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